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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Rule 3 of 
the Rules of The Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment granted by 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby of the Second Judicial District Court of 
Davis County, State of Utah, in Civil No. 45208. The Amended 
Order, Judgment and Decree was entered on the 16th day of July, 
1990. The Amended Notice of Appeal in the instant case was filed 
on the 20th of July, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the signing of a lien waiver abrogate a 
builderfs right to a cause of action for breach of contract based 
upon the failure of the owner to pay all of the sums due and 
owing under the terms of a construction contract? 
2. Did the Court fail to properly take into account 
the effect of the mutual mistake on the contract formed by the 
parties at the time of closing? 
3. Did the Court correctly rule that a lien waiver on 
the back of a check made payable to Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp. was effective in waiving Niederhauser Builders 
and Development Corp.fs right to a mechanic's lien where the 
course dealing between the parties was that progress payments 
were issued with a lien waiver on the back of each check, but the 
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intention of the parties was that the lien release only 
discharged the lien rights only as to the materials and labor for 
which payment was made by that particular check. 
4. Did the Court err in granting summary judgment 
against Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. on its causes 
of action for personal liability under the bonding statute and 
quantum meruit where those issues were not briefed nor argued 
before the Court? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff brought a claim for breach of contract, lien 
foreclosure, personal liability under the bonding statute and 
quantum meruit after a bank error at the closing resulted in the 
plaintiff being paid $5,319.62 less than the amount plaintiff was 
entitled to under the terms of the construction contract. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On April 3, 1989, plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp., filed its complaint against defendants, SCOTT 
G. CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA CAMPBELL. Defendants filed an answer and 
counterclaim on April 26, 1990. After conducting some discovery, 
both plaintiff and defendant filed motions for summary judgment. 
An Order, Judgment and Decree denying the plaintifffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granting the defendantsf Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed on October 27, 1989. An Amended Order, 
Judgment and Decree, which had the effect of a final order from 
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which an appeal could be taken pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure was filed on June 18, 1990. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
On September 12, 1989, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
presiding for the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
State of Utah, denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the 
plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice and declaring void and of no 
effect the plaintiff's lien upon the defendants' real property. 
A copy of the Amended Order, Judgment and Decree is attached as 
Exhibit "A". 
D. RELEVANT FACTS. 
1. On July 12, 1988, defendants, SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and 
CLAUDIA CAMPBELL, signed a Standard Form Agreement Between 
Contractor And Owner pursuant to the terms of which Niederhauser 
Builders and Development Corp. agreed to build a home for the 
Campbells. The price stated in the standard form agreement 
between contract and owner was to be $87,700.00. The contract 
further provided for change orders for all work not included in 
the contract (Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, R. 89). 
2. The Campbells home was built in an area where the 
residential covenant required the home to be built larger than 
the plans and specifications. The size of the home had to be 
increased. A statement was added to the contract that the 
increased size of the home as required by the architectural 
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committee would be treated as an extra and settled at the time of 
closing (R. 24). 
3. During the course of construction, progress 
payments were made to plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp. Each check contained a lien waiver which 
released all lien rights of the endorser up to the date of the 
check (Affidavit of Scott Campbell, R. 77). 
4. During the course of construction on the Campbells1 
home, there were changes and extras requested by the Campbells 
which totalled $7,727.19, and the Campbells over-spent their 
allowances by $4,786.00, which brought the total contract to 
$100,214.00 (Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, R. 90, 169). 
5. The Standard Form Of Agreement Between Contractor 
And Owner made defendants, CAMPBELLS, responsible for any 
construction loan costs, service charges, interest, points, etc., 
which were to be paid at the time of closing (copy of the 
Standard Form Of Agreement Between Contractor And Owner, R. 95). 
6. The total of the loan costs, service charges, 
interest and reconveyance fee totaled $5,080.91. This sum was in 
fact paid by Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. 
(Affidavit of Bryan Marston, R. 87). 
7. The cost of the lot purchased by the Campbells was 
$25,000.00 (Ruling on Motions, R. 154). 
8. The total cost of the Campbell home at the closing 
should have been: 
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$87,700.00 Basic contract price 
$7,727.19 Extras requested by Campbells 
$4,786.00 Campbells overspend allowance 
$5,080.91 Loan fees, interest, etc. on 
construction loan 
$25,000.00 Lot price 
$130,294.10 Total 
9. The total price for the Campbells' home was 
mistakenly calculated at the closing to be $125,214.00 (Ruling on 
Motions, R. 154). 
10. Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. 
received a total of $84,370.43 from the construction loan. 
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. received $10,204.24 
at the time of closing. Niederhauser Builders and Development 
Corp. received $49.91 as a refund for interest paid on the 
construction loan and $300.00 from an escrow established at the 
time of closing. The total amount of money received by 
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. for the construction 
of the Campbell home was $94,924.58 (Affidavit of Bruce 
Niederhauser, paragraph 6, R. 91). As defendants, SCOTT G. 
CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA CAMPBELL, had agreed to pay $100,244.20 to 
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. at the time of 
closing, and Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. had only 
received $94,924.58, Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. 
had an outstanding balance due and owing to it of $5,319.62 
(Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, paragraph 7, R. 91). 
11. On December 28, 1988, Lynn Niederhauser submitted 
a draw on the construction loan in the amount of $14,007.80. At 
that time, First Security Bank determined that the total amount 
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of the draw exceeded the amount left in the construction loan, 
whereupon First Security Bank of Utah designated a number of 
checks which totaled $5,639.33 to be paid at the closing of the 
Campbells1 property (Affidavit of Bryan Marston, paragraph 5, R. 
85). 
12. Employees of the Layton Branch of First Security 
Bank of Utah informed Greg Eborn of the Bountiful Branch of First 
Security Bank of Utah on a number of occasions that the 
construction loan payoff needed to be the amount of $109,644.96, 
and that in addition to that amount, checks needed to be drawn at 
the closing in the amount of $5,639.33 to pay the various 
laborers and suppliers who had provided labor and materials on 
the Campbells1 property. A copy of a draw sheet showing 
specifically those individuals who needed to be paid from the 
$5,639.33 amount was faxed by the Layton Branch of First Security 
Bank to Greg Eborn at the Bountiful Branch of First Security Bank 
(Affidavit of Bryan Marston, paragraph 6, R. 85-86). 
13. A mistake occurred at the closing of the 
Campbells* property and First Security Bank received from 
Associated Title a check in the amount of $109,644.96 to pay off 
the construction loan. However, First Security Bank did not 
receive any checks to pay the laborers and materialmen, which 
should have totaled $5,639.33 (Affidavit of Bryan Marston, 
paragraph 8, R. 86). 
14. Bruce Niederhauser prepared a document which was 
provided to the title company at the time of closing, which 
-6-
document showed the original contract price of $87,700.00 and 
allowance and extras in the amount of $12,514.00, which was added 
to produce a new contract price of $100,214.00 (this price did 
not include loan fees, or the cost of the lot. It only 
represented the amount owed to Niederhauser Builders). The 
document prepared by Bruce Niederhauser is attached as Exhibit 
"C" to his Supplemental Affidavit (Supplemental Affidavit of 
Bruce Niederhauser, paragraph 7, R. 169). 
15. From the total of $100,214.00 was subtracted the 
sum of $90,009.76, which represented draws that had been 
submitted to Layton Hills First Security Mortgage leaving a 
balance of $10,204.24. This amount of $10,204.24 was used by the 
title company as the payoff figure due to Niederhauser Builders 
and Development Corp. as shown by Exhibit "D" to the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser (Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce 
Niederhauser, paragraph 8, R. 169-170). 
16. At the time of the closing, Niederhauser Builders 
and Development Corp. had submitted draws to the Layton Branch of 
First Security Bank which totaled $90,009.76. Niederhauser 
Builders and Development Corp. was unaware that the draws 
exceeded the loan amount and the total of these draws was never 
paid to Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp.. The total 
amount paid to Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. from 
the construction loan only totaled $84,370.43 (Supplemental 
Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, paragraph 9, R. 170). 
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17. At the closing, when Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp. accepted a check for $10,204.24, the last draw 
from the construction loan had not been paid and Niederhauser 
Builders and Development Corp. was not aware that because of the 
fact that the draw request exceeded the loan amount, the entire 
draw would not be paid (Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce 
Niederhauser, paragraph 11, R. 170-171). 
18. Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. did 
not become aware of the problem in the total amount paid by the 
Campbells on their home until approximately January 6, 1989 and 
shortly thereafter informed the Campbells and First Security Bank 
of the problem (Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, 
paragraph 12, R. 171). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellantfs argument may be summarized as follows: 
A. The Court failed to consider the effect of the mutual 
mistake upon the contract formed by the parties at the closing on 
the defendant's home. 
B. The Court based its decision to grant defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment upon a lien waiver signed by the 
plaintiff. The lien waiver was on the back of a check made as a 
progress payment and should not have applied to the project as a 
whole, and under any circumstances, the signing of a lien waiver 
should not prohibit the plaintiff from pursuing causes of action 
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for breach of contract, personal liability under the bonding 
statute, and quantum meruit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EXECUTION OF A LIEN WAIVER DOES NOT ABROGATE A BUILDER'S 
RIGHT TO A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED UPON 
THE FAILURE OF THE OWNER TO PAY ALL OF THE SUMS DUE AND 
OWING UNDER THE TERMS OF A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT. 
The Court's memorandum decision entitled "Ruling on 
Motions", R. 154 - 155, in which the defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and the plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied does not address the issues in the 
case concerning the alleged breach of contract or the issue of 
what effect of the mutual mistake at the time of closing had on 
the contract. The only basis cited for the Court's decision in 
the Ruling on Motions is the fact that the plaintiff had signed a 
lien waiver and then had filed a mechanic's lien. 
The Order, Judgment and Decree, R. 195 - 197, and the 
Amended Order, Judgment and Decree, R. 287 - 288, do not address 
the issues of the alleged breach of contract or the issue of what 
effect the mutual mistake at the time of closing had upon the 
contract. 
The plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders and Development 
Corp., filed an objection to the Order, Judgment and Decree, R. 
186 - 187, in which the plaintiff alleged that the Court's 
decision recorded in the Ruling on Motions and the Order, 
Judgment and Decree did not address the issues of the breach of 
contract, the effect of the mistake at the closing had upon the 
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contract, the plaintifffs claims for personal liability under the 
bonding statute, or quantum meruit issues. 
The Court's ruling on the Objection to Judgment, R. 208 
- 209, simply states that "the Court's granting of summary 
judgment to defendants was intended to cover all causes of 
action, including breach of contract, quantum meruit, and failure 
to comply with bonding law". The Court gives no indication in 
the Ruling on the Objections to the Judgment on what basis the 
Court decides the issues concerning the breach of contract, the 
effect of the mistake at the closing on the contract, on what 
basis the defendants are not personally liable under the bonding 
law, or on what basis the plaintiff's claims for quantum meruit 
are denied. 
Because of the vagueness and the total failure of the 
Court, either in its own memorandum decision, or in its signed 
orders, to address the issues of the breach of contract, the 
effect of the mistake at closing upon the contract, the personal 
liability under the bonding statute, or the quantum meruit 
issues, a request to clarify the judgment was made by the 
plaintiff to the Court by a letter dated March 19, 1990, a copy 
of the letter is attached to this Brief as Exhibit "D" . The 
Court refused to clarify its judgment (Ruling on Motion to 
Clarify, R. 258). 
Since the only reason given in the Ruling on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment for the summary judgment of the defendant 
being granted was the fact that the plaintiff had signed a lien 
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waiver, it is reasonable to assume that the Court determined that 
plaintiff's signing of a lien waiver, in addition to waiving the 
plaintiff's liens rights, also waived the plaintiff's rights to 
proceed forward on a breach of contract cause of action. If such 
is the ruling of the Court, it is clearly erroneous under Utah 
law. 
This Court, in Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company v. 
Professional United World Travel Association, 592 P.2d 586 (Utah 
1979), in explaining the purpose of the mechanic's lien statutes, 
stated as follows: 
"The purpose of the liens thus created by 
statute is to assist in the collection of 
laborer's and materialmen's claims and not to 
diminish in any way the claimant's rights to 
enforce the obligation of contracts or any 
other remedy the claimant may have." 
Id. at 588. 
Since mechanic's liens statutes were intended to 
augment and not replace the rights of laborers and materialmen 
who have provided labor or materials in the improvement of real 
property, a lien waiver will not act to waive the rights of 
laborers and materialmen to their contract causes of action or 
their claims for personal liability under the bonding law. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska, in the case 
of Gibson v. Koutsky-Brennan-Vana Company, 9 N.W.2d 298 (Neb. 
1943), was faced with the specific issue of whether a lien waiver 
acted to waive the contract rights of a materialman who had 
provided materials in the improvement of real property. The 
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Nebraska Supreme Court, in ruling that a lien waiver had no such 
effect, stated as follows: 
"No contention is or can be made that 
defendant's waiver of a mechanic's lien 
destroyed its right to recover by whatever 
remedy available any balance due for material 
furnished to the plaintiffs, either before or 
after the execution and delivery of the 
waiver." Id. at 301. 
Similarly, this Court, in Pierce v. Pepper, 405 P.2d 
345 (Utah 1965), held that a lien waiver did not destroy the 
rights of a materialman to pursue a claim under Utah's bonding 
statute, §14-2-1, et seq. 
The fact that plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp., executed a lien waiver on the reverse side of 
a check therefore cannot prevent the plaintiff from pursuing its 
claims for breach of contract, personal liability under the 
bonding statute, and quantum meruit against defendants, SCOTT 
CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA CAMPBELL. 
H i THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EFFECT 
OF THE MUTUAL MISTAKE ON THE CONTRACT FORMED BY THE PARTIES 
AT THE TIME OF CLOSING. 
Again, what basis, if any, the Court had for ruling in 
favor of the defendants on the Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
contract issue is unclear, and the Court has refused to explain 
or to clarify the basis of its judgment. 
There was no dispute between the parties that a mistake 
occurred at the closing on the Campbells' home. The Affidavits 
of Bruce Niederhauser (R. 89 - 105, R. 167 - 180) and Bryan 
Marston establishing that a mistake occurred at the closing were 
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unopposed. Defendants did not deny that a mistake occurred, but 
rather suggested that Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. 
should pursue the bank rather than pursuing the defendants 
(Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 50 - 51). If, however, the Court felt that a 
contract was made at the time of closing where the price of the 
home would be $125,214.00 (Ruling on Motions, R. 155, Exhibit 
"C", Affidavit of Bruce Niederhauser, R. 98), then such a 
contract was based upon a mutual mistake of the parties. 
The law in the State of Utah is that a mutual mistake 
makes a contract voidable and is the basis for equitable 
recision. See Tanner v. District Court Judges, 649 P.2d 5, 6 
(Utah 1982) and Tarrant v. Monson, 619 P.2d 1210, 1211 (Nevada 
1980). 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Robert Langston Limited 
v. McQuarrie, 741 P. 2d 554, 557 (Utah 1987), defined a mutual 
mistake as follows: 
"A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, 
at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception about a basic assumption or 
vital fact upon which they base their 
bargain." 
In the case at bar, at the time of closing, both 
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. and the Campbells 
were laboring under a mistake as to the amount that was to be 
paid to Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. from the 
construction loan. Both plaintiff and defendants assumed that 
the final draw on the construction loan would be paid in full. 
-13-
It cannot be disputed that the cost of the home is a basic 
assumption or vital fact upon which the agreements reached at 
closing were based. 
In the most recent decision of this Court concerning 
the doctrine of mistake, in the case of Guardian State Bank v. 
Stangl, this Court ruled that even a unilateral mistake as to the 
legal effect of a contract was sufficient to give a Court power 
to reform the contract. In the Guardian state case, this Court 
stated as follows: 
"In its most simple and most straight-forward 
sense, the law really only enforces the 
intent of the parties as to the fundamental 
agreement between them; a mistake in the 
recordation or the moralization of an 
agreement or document may not be exploited by 
one party to take advantage of the other. 
Principals of common honesty are not foreign 
to the law and equity." 
In the case at bar, the defendants, CAMPBELLS, are 
attempting to take advantage of a mutual mistake made between the 
parties. The Campbells contracted for Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp. to build a home for them on a specific lot. 
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. built a home pursuant 
to the terms of the contract, which had a value, once all of the 
additions and overruns by the Campbells in their allowances were 
calculated, of $130,294.10. The total of the payments and 
credits made by the Campbells at the time of closing was 
$125,214.00, leaving a balance due and owing of $5,080.10. 
(These figures do not include amounts paid by Campbells for their 
own long term financing.) Although all parties to the 
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transaction have recognized that a mistake occurred, the 
Campbells have attempted to take advantage of the mistake which 
was made to the detriment of the plaintiff, Niederhauser Builders 
and Development Corp. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A LIEN WAIVER ON THE BACK OF 
A CHECK MADE PAYABLE TO NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND 
DEVELOPMENT CORP. WAS EFFECTIVE IN WAIVING NIEDERHAUSER 
BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.!S RIGHT TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN 
WHERE THE COURSE OF DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS THAT 
PROGRESS PAYMENTS WERE ISSUED WITH A LIEN WAIVER ON THE BACK 
OF EACH CHECK AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS THAT THE 
LIEN RELEASE ONLY DISCHARGED THE LIEN RIGHTS AS TO THE 
MATERIALS AND LABOR FOR WHICH PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THAT 
PARTICULAR CHECK. 
The course of dealing between the parties in this 
construction contract was that progress payments were made and 
each check contained a lien waiver which contained the following 
language: 
"Lien waiver: In consideration of the 
payment of this check, the payee, by 
endorsing, causing to be endorsed, stamping 
this check with a deposit stamp, or otherwise 
negotiating the same, waives, releases and 
relinquishes all right of lien or claims 
payee has to date upon the premises described 
on the reverse side hereof. The payee 
certifies that this check is payment for 
labor and/or materials that were actually 
performed upon and/or furnished to the 
described premises. Payee warrants and 
guarantees under penalty of fraud that 
payment in full has been made by the payee to 
all of the laborers and suppliers of labor 
and all materials to the said premises 
incurred to date at the instance of payee. 
Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless 
the owner and First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. and/or its assigns from any loss, claims 
or expenses by reason or rising out of said 
lien or claim." (Affidavit of Scott 
Campbell, R. 77; Lien Waiver, R. 56) 
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A copy of three separate checks with the identical lien 
waiver is found in the record at page 56. 
Where lien waivers are signed on progress payments, 
this Court has refused to treat the lien waiver as applying to 
the entire construction project, but rather has treated the lien 
waiver as applying only to those specific items of labor or 
materials paid for by the specific check. 
In Brimwood Homes Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply 
Company, the issue before this Court was the "import and effect 
of the provision" in the "receipt and lien release" that "in 
consideration thereof, the undersigned hereby waives, releases 
and discharges any lien right to the lien the undersigned has or 
may hereafter require against said real property". As in the 
case at bar, in the Brimwood Homes case, in order to receive 
payment on an ongoing construction contract, laborers and 
materialmen were required to sign lien releases which contained 
the language quoted above. When the owner failed to make the 
final payment for the construction on the real property, he 
contended that the laborers and materialmen could not file a lien 
based upon the lien releases which had been signed throughout the 
period of the ongoing construction. This Court, however, ruled 
as follows: 
"Under the circumstances of this case, we do 
not believe that the defendant, nor the 
plaintiff, intended that the release and 
waiver agreement would relate to any future 
lien rights which the defendant might 
acquire. The executed documents, designated 
as a 'release and waiver1 related only to the 
particular debt paid and receipted for in the 
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particular transaction encompassed by that 
particular instrument." Id, at 984. 
Further, in the Brimwood Homes case, this Court 
specifically found that: 
"Defendant, in receiving payments from 
Prudential, was being paid no more than what 
it was legally entitled to at the time. 
Thus, a promise by defendant to waive rights 
of future liens or other debts would be 
without consideration." Id. at 984. 
The holding of this Court in Brimwood Homes, supra., is 
consistent with the trend of other state courts in the 
interpretation of mechanic's lien statutes. In Portland Electric 
and Plumbing Company v. Simpson, 651 P.2d 172 (Ore. App. 1982), 
the Court of Appeals for the State of Oregon, in deciding the 
identical issue of whether a lien release on the back of a check 
representing progress payments, released all of the rights of the 
individual to lien the property, ruled as follows: 
"Here, the language of the lien release is 
broad and susceptible to an all encompassing 
interpretation. However, given the 
circumstances of its execution, not as part 
of a single document referring to the entire 
construction contract, but as part of each 
progress payment, the more reasonable 
interpretation is that the discharge released 
the plaintiff's lien rights only as to 
materials for which payment was made by a 
particular check." Id. at 174. 
In Ragsdale Brothers Roofing Inc. v. United Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 744 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1987), the Court of 
Appeals for the State of Colorado, in ruling that a partial lien 
waiver did not waive a lien for all materials and labor provided 
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on the subject property to the date of the check on which the 
lien waiver was written, stated as follows: 
"According to his unrebutted testimony, he 
was required to sign a partial waiver each 
time he received a partial payment from the 
owner and the amount of the payment he 
received was to reflect the dollar amount 
waived. We find the circumstances and 
language made the waiver ambiguous as to 
whether it was a waiver of lien rights to 
date or merely a waiver for the amount paid. 
If the terms of the contract and evidence of 
the alleged waiver of mechanic's lien are 
ambiguous, doubt must be resolved against the 
waiver. (Citations omitted.) In absence of 
language clearly indicating an intention to 
waive a lien, it will not be supposed that 
the labor or materialmen intended to 
relinquish absolutely his statutory right to 
claim one beyond the amount of consideration 
received." Id. at 754 - 755. 
In the case at bar, Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp. performed no additional labor after January 6, 
1989, the date on which it signed the lien waiver. The check 
amount correctly reflected the amount of funds left due and owing 
to Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. for work done by 
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. up to that time. 
However, Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. did not 
receive checks which should have paid other of its subcontractors 
on this project. Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. had 
no reason to believe that by signing this check they were signing 
a final lien waiver for the entire project as the course of 
dealing had always been that when the partial payments were 
issued, the lien waivers on the back of the checks applied only 
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to the specific work performed or materials provided and paid for 
by that specific check. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF, NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., ON 
ITS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER THE 
BONDING STATUTE AND QUANTUM MERUIT WHERE THOSE ISSUES WERE 
NOT BRIEFED NOR ARGUED BEFORE THE COURT. 
The universal rule is that a judgment must be based on 
facts. A judgment cannot be based on guess, conjecture or 
speculation. Oldenburg v. Sears Roebuck and Company, 314 P.2d 33 
(Cal. App. 1957); In re: HaydenTs Estate, 254 P.2d 813 (Kan. 
1953); Sisler v. Whitten, 393 P.2d 497 (Ok. 1964). A judgment 
must be based on facts and a judgment founded on doubts cannot 
stand. Evans v. Evans, 314 P. 2d 291 (Colo. 1957). A judgment 
should not be allowed to rest on speculation and conjecture 
alone. Jephson v. Ambuel, 473 P.2d 932 (Id. 1970). Where there 
is no evidence to support a trial court's finding, other than 
basing the finding on pure guess work, the judgment cannot be 
sustained. Campbell v. Schwers-Campbell, Inc., 245 P.2d 497 
(M.M. 1955). Judgments cannot rest on speculation or conjecture 
and there must be some substantial evidence for their support. 
Crewse v. Munroe, 355 P.2d 637 (Or. 1960). 
The record in this case may be searched in vain for any 
argument concerning the personal liability of the defendants 
under the bonding law statute or the plaintiff's claims to 
quantum meruit if the building contract did not include all or 
some of the extras provided by Niederhauser Builders and 
Development Corp. to the Campbells. There was nothing in the 
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briefs submitted by the plaintiffs or the defendants nor were the 
issues concerning the bonding law and quantum meruit included in 
the oral argument. Since there was absolutely no information 
provided to the Court on these causes of action, it is difficult 
to understand on what basis the Court would determine that the 
plaintiff had no cause of action on these two theories. 
As already noted in this Brief, the only reason given 
by this Court in its memorandum decision or in the two Orders 
signed by the Court as to why the defendantsf Motion for Summary 
Judgment was granted and the plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was denied was that the plaintiff had signed a lien 
waiver. As previously noted, this Court has already ruled that 
the signing of a lien waiver does not prevent the claimant from 
pursuing his rights under §14-2-1, et seq. Utah's statute which 
provides for personal liability if the owner fails to obtain a 
payment bond. Pierce v. Pepper, 405 P.2d 345 (Utah 1965). 
The principals of justice and fairness are violated 
when a court, without any information before it, either in the 
form of briefs, affidavits or oral arguments, makes decisions on 
causes of action and then declines to inform parties on what 
basis the court made such a determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the trial court's granting of 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment in that it failed to take 
into consideration the mutual mistake upon the contract formed by 
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the parties at the time of the closing on the Campbells' 
property. The lien release signed by the plaintiff would not 
have the effect of waiving the plaintiff's rights to pursue 
causes of action for breach of contract, personal liability under 
the bonding statute, or for quantum meruit claims. The Court 
therefore also erred in granting summary judgment against the 
plaintiff on those claims. 
DATED this £/ day of November, 1990. 
SMITH & HANNA 
brief.ni# 
By 
Charles W. Hanna 
Attorney for Appellant 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)355-5656 
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I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, first class, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief for Appellant, in Case No, 900301, this (y\\ day of 
November, 1990, to: 
W. Jerry Ungricht 
NIEDER & WARD 
7050 S. Union Park Ave., #420 
Midvale, UT 84047 
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EXHIBIT A 
W. JERRY UNGRICHT, #3305 
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 3030 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
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BY 
DEPUTYCLEK; 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA 
CAMPBELL, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER, 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 45208 
Judge Douglas Cornaby 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on plaintiff's 
and defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, before the Honorable 
Douglas Cornaby, District Court Judge on September 12, 1989, the 
plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by Charles W. 
Hanna, and the defendants appearing in person and being repre-
sented by W. Jerry Ungricht. The Court, having heard the 
testimony and argument of counsel, and being fully advised, and 
having entered its ruling on the motions, which is incorporated 
by reference herein, therefore, 
* * . * » 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
The defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plain-
tiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The plaintiff's lien filed on the following described 
property belonging to the defendants located at 1349 East Skyline 
Drive, Bountiful, Utah, and legally described as: 
"All of Lot 44, Quailbrook Subdivision, Plat A, 
according to the official plat thereof as recorded in 
the Office of the Davis County Recorder." 
which lien was filed in the Davis County Recorder's Office on 
March 7, 1989, as Entry No. 851370, in Book 1281, at page 346, of 
the records of said county, is void and of no effect. 
3. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendants, as and 
for attorney's fees, the sum of $5,285.50. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendants, as and 
for costs of court incurred herein, the sum of $60.00. 
DATED this /£ day of ,S^/s , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
EXHIBIT B FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE DAVIS CCUJiTY. UTAH 
OCT 21 !U2i !83 
In the Second Judicial District Court ^ 
in and for the CLERK, 2MuD'ST. COURT 
County of Davis, State of Utaft A& DEFUTf OLERX 
NIEDERHAUSER BUILDERS AND ) 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Utah 
Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
SCOTT G. CAMPBELL and CLAUDIA ) 
CAMPBELL, 
) 
Defendants. 
RULING ON OBJECTIONS 
TO JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 45208 
On October 11, 1989, the plaintiff filed objections to the 
defendant's proposed judgment. The defendant filed the proposed 
judgment on October 6, 1989. The court now rules on the 
objections. 
The plaintiff argues that defendants should only be awarded 
partial summary judgment. Such is not the case. The court's 
granting of * summary judgment to the defendants was intended to 
cover all causes of action, including breach of contract, quantum 
meruit, and failure to comply with bonding law. 
In the September 14, 1989 ruling the court awarded the 
defendants a reasonable attorney fee. The plaintiff complains 
that $6,230.50 is not reasonable. It may not be. The court will 
set it for hearing. The court believes the defendants are 
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee to defend against the lien 
foreclosure claim. Of necessity this must include defending to 
some degree the claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit and 
failure to comply with the bonding law. The counterclaim, 
riLmn 
however, is clearly not included in reasonable attorneys fees. 
Counsel are urged prior to the hearing to settle this matter 
without hearing. If the defendants win at the hearing, the court 
will award another attorney fee. 
The court is signing the judgment today, except as to 
attorneys fees, which will be determined by stipulation or at a 
hearing to be set by the court. 
Dated October 26, 1989. 
BY THEL COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to W. Jerry Ungricht, Suite 
520 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and Charles W. 
Hanna, City Centre I, Suite 401, 175 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111 on October 27, 1989. 
Deputy Clerk 
!c\/(x TjpAHb 
EXHIBIT C WpWVS /S OFFICE 
SE? 18 9 co ti\ 583 
In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the CLE"/., : . . : . ^C'.IT 
County of Davis, State of Utah
 BY *A__ i_ J l y 
N1EDERHAUSER BUILDERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT G. CAMPBELL, et al. , 
Defendants, 
RULING ON MOTIONS 
Civil No. 45208 
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment came before the court 
for hearing on September 12, 1989 with Charles W. Hanna appearing 
as counsel for the plaintiff and W. Jerry Ungricht appearxng as 
counsel for the defendants. After oral argument, the court took 
the motions under advisement. The court now rules on the 
motions. 
The parties entered into a basic contract on July 12, 1988. 
The amount of the contract was for $87,700. The contract 
provided that the buyers would pay an increased cost because of 
an addition to the size of the home and also would pay 
construction loan costs. The contract also provided that any 
authorized change orders will be used for all work not included 
in the contract. 
On the date of December 30, 1988, a document entitled 
addendum was signed by both parties. This addendum was a 
settlement of righta under the contract and provided that the 
initial bid price -of the house had been $87,700, that the lot 
price was $25,000, and that the agreed new price would be 
$125,214. This means that the buyers were required to pay to the 
FJLAJED 
plaintiff an additional $12,514 in addition to the original 
contract price. 
There is a document in the file entitled settlement 
statement. This statement was executed .and signed on December 
30, 1988. It shows the contract price was $125,214. After each 
party was given credits for their various entitlements, the 
plaintiff was to be paid a check of $10,204.24. 
There is a check in the file issued by Associated Title 
Company of Davis County payable to the plaintiff in the amount of 
$10,204.24. This check was dated January 4, 1989. It was 
apparently paid through the bank on January 9, 1989 and in the 
endorsement it bears the signature of the plaintiff. The amount 
of the check was the same amount shown on the settlement 
statement. 
One of the documents in the file is the back of a check 
endorsed by the plaintiff on January 6, 1989. It bears the 
following statement, "Signature required on both lien waiver and 
endorsement." Number one is listed as a lien waiver, and bears 
the signature of the plaintiff. Number two calls for an 
endorsement of the check and is endorsed by the plaintiff. The 
lien waiver portion states that endorsement of the check was "a 
release and relinquishment of all right of lien or claims payee 
now has to date upon the premises described on the reverse side 
hereof." 
On March 7, 1989, the plaintiff caused a lien in the amount 
of $5,319.62 to be filed against the property. Thereafter, on 
April 3, 1989, the plaintiff commenced this action claiming the 
amount of $5,319.62 to be owed by the defendants to the plaintiff 
and arising out of the contract. The plaintiff was asking for a 
foreclosure of the lien and the sale of the property in order to 
pay the amount requested. 
Under the set of facts recited herein, based on the 
documents that are part of the file it is clear that the 
defendant is entitled to its motion for summary judgment. The 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. The plaintiff 
filed a lien after agreeing not to file any liens against the 
property. When the plaintiff filed the notice of lien in this 
case, it violated its agreement not to do so. The defendants 
have been the prevailing parties in this case and are therefore 
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for defending it. The 
counsel for the defendant is directed to submit an affidavit of 
reasonable attorney fees to the court and to opposing counsel. 
If opposing counsel does not agree as to the reasonableness of 
the attorney fee requested, the court will set the matter for a 
hearing. 
The defendant is ordered to draw an order consistent with 
this ruling. 
Dated September 14, 1989. 
B^THE COURT: A 
JUBGE^ / 
Certificate of Mailing: / 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Charles W. Hanna, City 
Centre I, Suite 401, 175 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and W. Jerry Ungricht, Suite 520 Boston Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on September £4, 1989. 
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EXHIBIT D 
O F C O U N S E L . 
MATTHEW M «\ H I L T O N 
March 19, 1390 
HAND DELIVERED 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
Davis County Courthouse 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Re: Robert W. Speirs Plumbing v. Scott G. Campbell 
Civil No. S90746720CV 
Dear Judge Cornaby: 
On October 26, 1989, you signed a Summary Judgment in 
the case of Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Scott 
G. Campbell and Claudia Campbell. Subsequently, on or about 
December 12, 1989, I filed a Complaint on behalf of two 
subcontractors of Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. for 
the labor and materials which they provided on the Campbell home. 
On the 21st of February, 1990, Jerry Ungricht, the attorney for 
the Campbells, filed a Third Party Complaint against Niederhauser 
Builders and Development Corp. alleging that they had paid 
Niederhauser in full for all work performed under the contract 
for building the Campbells' home. 
The purpose of this letter is to request that Mr. 
Ungricht and I might meet with you for a few moments to discuss 
the basis of your judgment in Niederhauser Builders v. Scott and 
Claudia Campbell. Specifically, I would like to understand 
whether you found that the Campbells had completely complied with 
the terms of their contract or whether you found that the 
Campbells had not breached their contract because of a waiver by 
Niederhauser Builders and Development Corp. The Niederhauser 
Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell case is currently en 
appeal and 1 have the court's file in order to draft my brief. I 
am therefore enclosing a copy of your memorandum decision in 
order to refresh your memory on this matter. 
If it would be possible for Mr. Ungricht and I to meet 
with you for just a few moments on Wednesday, March 21, 1990, it 
would be greatly appreciated. 
\ L S O A D M I T T E D TO P R A C T I C E IN C O L O R A D O 
<VLSO A D M I T T E D TO P R A C T I C E IN OKLAHOMA 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaoy 
Marcn 19, 1990 
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Thank you for your help and cooperation in this matter 
Very truly yours, 
BROWN, SMIT;# & HANNA 
Charles W. Kanna 
CWH/klh 
Enclosures 
